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THREE FALLACIES OF CONTEMPORARY
JURISPRUDENCE
Frank S. Alexander*
Travelers along Interstate 84 west of Danbury, Connecticut in 1984
encountered a large sign proclaiming in bold letters, "ROAD LE-
GALLY CLOSED-UNDER CONSTRUCTION-PASS AT YOUR
OWN RISK." Drivers observing this rather curious sign as they contin-
ued down the interstate in heavy traffic knew that the highway was in-
deed under construction, but what could it have meant that the road was
"legally closed"? Would it mean that no laws were applicable to those
who elected to "pass at their own risk"? Would it mean that there were
no speed limit laws, or rules of liability in the event of an accident or
insurance protection? The ease with which public officials have erected
such a sign and the uncritical acceptance of the words of the sign by
highway drivers reflect the dismal state of contemporary jurisprudence.
An adequate theory of law requires more than simply announcing an
uncertain legal conclusion to an undefined community for unknown
purposes.
The thesis of this Article will be counterintuitive to many readers.
It argues that we lack an adequate theory of law today in large part be-
cause we fail to address the very questions we ask about religious faith.
These questions, in their most fundamental forms, deal with ontology,
teleology and epistemology. The ontological question examines the au-
thority of law in terms of one's conception of being, whether as autono-
mous individuals or as part of a community.1 The teleological question
inquires of the purpose or function which justifies particular laws.' The
epistemological question reflects the limits, if any, to what we believe can
* B.A. 1973, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1978, Harvard University; M.T.S. 1978,
Harvard University. Assistant Professor, Emory University School of Law, Atlanta, Georgia;
Of Counsel, Kutak, Rock & Campbell, Atlanta, Georgia. This Article, in a preliminary and
condensed form, was presented as part of a symposium on "Religion and the Social Crisis" at
Wake Forest University on September 27, 1983. I am especially indebted to Professor Tim
Terrell and my assistant Greg Hassler for their encouragement, guidance and support through
numerous drafts of this Article.
1. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ontology as follows: "The science or study of
being; that department of metaphysics which relates to the being or essence of things, or to
being in the abstract" 15 OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY 131 (1971). See infra notes 87-95
and accompanying text.
2. The Oxford English Dictionary defines teleology as follows: "The doctrine or study of
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be achieved through law.3 These questions in turn reveal three basic fal-
lacies in contemporary jurisprudence with which this Article will be con-
cerned: respectively, the ontological error, the teleological confusion and
the epistemological arrogance of current legal theory.
Theories of legal education and law today lack a direct inquiry into
basic assumptions concerning the nature of humanity and the implica-
tions of transcendent reality. With the emergence of law as a science and
the ascendence of empirical knowledge, students and practitioners of law
have become curiously hesitant to acknowledge that the question of
"what is law" may have something to do with the question of "what is
faith."
An ontological inquiry focuses on the underlying conception of be-
ing and, in the context of law, brings into question the sources of author-
ity of law. Conventional approaches to the study and practice of law,
whether in terms of positivism or natural law, are characterized by the
assumption that we are capable of ascertaining the nature of law with
certainty and precision. For example, to the positivist a declaration that
a road is "legally closed" can be called "law" if one can demonstrate the
underlying authority of such a declaration-usually a legislative enact-
ment or judicial opinion. In much of traditional natural law jurispru-
dence an immutable principle of truth can be ascertained by individuals.
But in both perspectives the fact that it is we who enact the laws and
rulings and the fact that it is we who are subject to the law seem only
coincidental. Law today reflects only a concept of necessary community,
not essential community. That is, we study the law out of necessity be-
cause we happen to live together, rather than because we find in our
living tegether the very source, or essence, of law. This is the ontological
fallacy of contemporary jurisprudence: the neglect of community as an
essential source of meaning for life together.
The teleological confusion in contemporary jurisprudence is its in-
ability to distinguish the multiple functions of law. There are strikingly
few attempts today to differentiate the normative assumptions of laws
which limit governmental liability for highway accidents from those laws
which allocate liability between highway travelers. This confusion of
functions is in turn based upon a simplistic belief in a narrowly instru-
mental purpose of law. Ignored, if not forgotten, is the possibility that
ends or final causes, esp. as related to the evidences of design or purpose in nature." 20 Ox-
FORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 149 (1971). See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
3. The Oxford English Dictionary defines epistemology as follows: "The theory or sci-
ence of the method or grounds of knowledge." 5 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 246 (1971).
See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
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certain laws may find validity in ultimate purposes involving life together
as opposed to finding validity in policy goals. The individualism and
rationalism embraced in contemporary jurisprudence are inherently lim-
ited, and limiting, perspectives.
Unwilling to consider the fundamental importance of community to
law, and confusing the multiplicity of functions of law, contemporary
jurisprudence further blinds itself by a self-righteous exclusiveness of
method: a false epistemology. The ability of legal philosophers, judges
and legislators to provide an answer carries with it the strong assumption
that the answer provided is the ideal answer. For an unsuspecting trav-
eler, an official announcement of a change in legal rights and liabilities
suggests little of the propriety or soundness of such a change; yet we
believe that simply by posting the sign we accomplish the correct result.
A view of the nature and function of law which contains an implicit con-
viction that law, or laws, can yield the right solution is intolerant of am-
biguity and insistent upon certainty. The hubris which characterizes so
much of our attitudes towards the efficacy of law is the third fallacy of
contemporary jurisprudence: that of a self-righteous and intolerant
epistemology.
The impoverishment of contemporary jurisprudence is due to these
three fallacies: the ontological error, teleological confusion and an intol-
erant epistemology. Each of these fallacies, however, is not unique to
postmodern legal thinking. Rather, they are the natural consequences of
the individualism and rationalism shaping American law. A reformula-
tion of law which avoids these errors is possible through an appreciation
of the theological, debates over individual autonomy and rationalism in
the early Enlightenment period. Two such controversies in particular,
Arminianism4 and Socinianism,5 provide close parallels to the dilemma
confronting jurisprudence and legal scholarship today.
By approaching the study and practice of law with a richer aware-
ness of the theological contexts of law in history, one begins to under-
stand more fully the nature of our present confusion. A theory of law
which contains the additional perspectives of theological possibilities and
limitations will radically reorient our perceptions of the nature and func-
tion of law.
An example of the inadequacies of contemporary jurisprudence in-
volves the current legal response to the new phenomenon of commercial
pregnancy contracts.6 Although the law as a social institution has had
4. See infra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
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considerable experience resolving disputes concerning written contrac-
tual relationships, legal responses to these new and unique situations in-
dicate that that experience seems better suited for generating easy and
ready answers than substantively acceptable solutions. The novel pos-
sibilities and difficulties which commercial pregnancy contracts present
to our culture, and in particular our culture's understanding of the na-
ture and function of law, are challenges that require a fundamental re-
thinking of the very manner in which we understand law.
Part I of this Article establishes the parameters of the thesis and
explores the characteristics of contemporary theories of law. In this con-
text, the debate provoked by Critical Legal Studies is examined in order
to indicate the need to ask of law various theological questions. Part II
probes the nature of the ontological, teleological and epistemological
questions in the theological controversies that helped shape the Enlight-
enment, from which so much of our legal and intellectual heritage is de-
rived. The final part of this Article suggests a framework through which
basic theories of law and their assumptions might be reordered.
I. THE Loss OF NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF LAW
In its efforts to ascertain the assumptions upon which law is
founded, contemporary jurisprudence has created a descriptive instead of
a normative or critical vernacular. "Morals," "values," "standards,"
"principles," "institutional prejudices" and "veil of ignorance" are neu-
tral terms denoting the hesitancy to engage in critical inquiries that may
well strengthen the foundations themselves. Current efforts to probe
such assumptions of law have one deficiency in common: contemporary
theories of the nature and function of law share an absence of any direct
inquiry into basic assumptions concerning the nature of humanity and
the possibility of transcendence.
Legal scholarship in this century is pervaded by a defensiveness that
reveals the renunciation of the relevancy of theological questions to law.
For decades "Natural Law" has been a term of derision cast at those who
open their investigations of the nature of law to the possibility of tran-
scendent qualities.7
7. Though theories of natural law received some attention in legal scholarship in the
1930's, the serious development of natural law theories was confined to variations ofa Thomis-
tic analysis. See, eg., C. HAINES, THE REVivAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930). See
also Comment, Jurisprudential Aims of Church Law Schools in the United States, 13 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 163 (1938). For an excellent summary of the perspectives and debates of legal
realism, natural law and positivism during the middle years of this century, see E. PURCELL,
THE CIuSIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 159-78 (1973).
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Contemporary jurisprudence is in disarray not because it lacks a co-
herent theory of natural law. Rather, the unwillingness of much contem-
porary legal scholarship to acknowledge the relevancy of fundamental
theological propositions to theories of the nature and function of law re-
strains a sense of the fullness of law.8
A. Loss of Normative Foundations: What of Law and Morals?
In a series of addresses given sixty years ago entitled "Law and
Morals," Roscoe Pound concluded that jurisprudence had made little if
any progress in understanding the common foundations of law and
morals over the centuries, despite the advent of rationalism.9 In his criti-
cism of the ultimate futility of historical and analytical schools of juris-
prudence, Pound suggested that both approaches simply constructed
their own methods of determining and justifying the content of law.
Whereas historical jurisprudence idealized history, analytical jurispru-
dence was self-justifying in its application of scientific methodology to
law. 10 The problem with the study of law and morals of the 1920's,
Pound concluded, lay not in the recreation or rediscovery of a body of
natural law containing the "eternal immutable law of nature,"11 for that
was the fatal error of late seventeenth and eighteenth century jurispru-
dence. The hope for comprehension of law and morals, Pound sug-
gested, may lie in a creative natural law:
Already there is a revival of natural law-not of the natural law
that would have imposed upon us an idealized version of the
law of the past as something from which we might never es-
cape, but of a creative natural law that would enable us to make
of our received legal materials, as systematized by the legal sci-
ence of the last century, a living instrument of justice in the
society of today and of tomorrow. Such a natural law will not
8. The recent works of John Finnis, J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
(1980), Harold Berman, H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974); H.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION
(1983), Thomas Shaffer, T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981), and
others stand as significant exceptions to the dominant theories in post-World War II jurispru-
dence. As exceptions, however, these writings confirm the need to develop a coherent concep-
tual framework which permits the questions we ask of religious faith to be asked of law. The
new Journal of Law and Religion is a major exception to the dearth of legal scholarship on
questions of law, religion and ethics. See Vogel, A Survey and Commentary on the New Litera-
ture in Law and Religion, 1 J. L. & RELIGION 79 (1983); Morden, An Essay on the Connections
Between Law and Religion, 2 J. L. & RELIGION 7 (1984).
9. R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS 11-12 (1926).
10. Id. at 41-42.
11. Id. at 33.
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call upon us to turn treatises on ethics or economics or sociol-
ogy directly into institutes of law. But it will not be content
with a legal science that refuses to look beyond or behind for-
mal legal precepts and so misses more than half of what goes to
make up the law .... It will not be content with a jurispru-
dence that excludes the ends of law and criticism of legal
precepts with reference to those ends. 12
Whether one agrees with Dean Pound's optimism that a creative
natural law provides the key to understanding law and morals, the study
of law in the last sixty years has made little progress in ascertaining the
fundamental sources or content of law. The only significant changes in
theories of law and justice today from those Pound had before him are an
increased skepticism, sophistical complexities and a renewed emphasis
on objective verification. Leading legal scholars recently reflected these
significant changes in their debates about the ambiguity of the term
"equality" as a legal concept.1 3 Even to pose this question suggests how
far we have come toward an empiricist mode of thinking.
Ronald Dworkin has suggested that any theory of law and justice
falls into one of three typologies: a goal-based theory (such as utilitarian-
ism's focus on maximizing happiness), a right-based theory (emphasiz-
ing, for example, fundamental rights expressed in a social contract) or a
duty-based theory (such as Kant's concept of categorical imperatives). 14
In developing these alternative typologies, Dworkin states that the com-
mon feature of right-based and duty-based theories is that the individual
is of central importance. 5 In both, moral rules and codes of conduct are
indispensable. "Duty-based theories treat such codes of conduct as of
the essence, whether set by society to the individual or by the individual
to himself."16 "Right-based theories are, in contrast, concerned with the
independence rather than the conformity of individual action." 7 Dwor-
kin also suggests, almost in passing, that a duty-based theory could sup-
12. Id. at 82-83.
13. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982); Burton, Comment
on "Empty Ideas" Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136
(1982); Westen, On "Confusing Ideas"- Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1982); Chemerinsky, In
Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 575 (1983); Westen, The
Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 604
(1983).
14. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 169-77 (1977).
15. Id. at 172. In contrast, "[g]oal-based theories are concerned with the welfare of any
particular individual only in so far as this contributes to some state of affairs stipulated as good
quite apart from his choice of that state of affairs." Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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port a concept of self-interest if derived from a moral law based in "God"
or in Kant's universal rules.' 8
Dworkin's analysis demonstrates just how far we have come in our
inability to seek an ultimate and transcendent foundation of law. For
example, J.L. Mackie, a leading critic of Dworkin, quickly accused
Dworkin of "playing fast and loose with the law."1 9 According to
Mackie, there is simply no room in theories of law for Dworkin's duty-
based theory. Instead, Mackie asserts, there are only two alternatives:
some form of natural law doctrine, which he suggests would allow "the
consciences and the speculations of judges to intervene more significantly
between what the legislative and executive branches try to do";20 and the
positivism of Mackie's own preference, according to which "[tihe validity
of a law is wholly relative to the legal system to which it belongs. Conse-
quently the finding out of what is the law is an empirical task, not a
matter of a priori reasoning. "21
What is transpiring, largely sub silentio, in these debates in contem-
porary jurisprudence is what Pound recognized sixty years ago in decry-
ing that the state provides the ultimate criteria for validating the law.22
Any position or theory that suggests, through moral philosophy, juris-
prudence or theology, the existence of certain norms or morals which are
transcendent in nature and serve as sources of authority for law is
quickly labelled "Natural Law." The Natural Law position is then su-
perficially refuted by the simple observation of the existence of a different
set of norms or moral principles inconsistent with the first. Since neither
participant in this debate can "prove" rationally or logically that his or
her set of moral principles is necessarily correct and the other set incor-
rect, morals and norms are therefore assumed to be inherently subjective
and relative. On the other hand, the argument continues, law may be
relative in the sense of historical and cultural contingencies, but it cannot
be wholly subjective since the foundation of law must ultimately reside in
the sovereign and the state.
The alternatives of an ostensibly objective approach of positivism
and a natural law theory riddled with attacks of subjectivity have left
contemporary jurisprudence in a state of confusion and disarray.
18. Id. at 175.
19. Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AlT. 3, 15 (1977).
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id. at 4. But see Mackie, Can There Be a Right-Based Moral Theory?, 3 MIDWEST
STUD. PHILOSOPHY 350 (1978) in which Mackie himself attempts to formulate a right-based
theory.
22. R. POUND, supra note 9, at 13.
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B. The Critique of Critical Legal Studies
The growing movement identified by its adherents as "Critical Legal
Studies" reflects the difficulty in developing a coherent view of the nature
and function of law. Increasingly dissatisfied with the unwillingness of
contemporary scholarship to admit its ideological and normative presup-
positions, the proponents of Critical Legal Studies attack the dominant
theories of law as being fundamentally incapable of normative discourse.
This inability to engage in normative discourse is considered to be the
ultimate futility of liberal political thought.
At the center of the challenge advanced by Critical Legal Studies
proponents is the issue of the inability of rational discourse to discern
"objective" principles or values which constitute both the substance and
the justification of a rule of law.23 The implicit conviction of liberal ra-
tionalism, a label given to contemporary political and legal thought, is
that there are fundamental values which are realized over time through
free expression and discourse among the population, the legislatures and
the judiciary. From the perspective of Critical Legal Studies, contempo-
rary legal thought assumes that the dynamic processes of interaction
among groups and institutions in our society, safeguarded by ephemeral
touchstones of equal protection and due process, give credence to a "rule
of law" which is both rational and foundational to positive law. The key
is rationality. A devout belief in the viability and sufficiency of human
reason, combined with a rejection of the subjectivity of legal norms, yield
the appearance of a close approximation of justice over time.
The attack of Critical Legal Studies on contemporary theory is es-
sentially two-fold. First, the major premise of liberal rationalism-that
there are neutral processes which express objective rules of law-is chal-
lenged as fundamentally unsound:
Legal scholars' professional endeavors may make them aware
that legal rules have no objective content. They cannot bring
this personal insight into their scholarly work, however, be-
cause their acceptance of fundamental principles of liberal
political theory requires them to proceed as if legal rules do
23. As described by Duncan Kennedy, the Critical Legal Studies movement "[is] trying to
do radical legal scholarship." Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J.
1275, 1275 (1981). This declaration was made in the context of a Symposium on legal scholar-
ship, the proceedings of which appear in Symposium, Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and Pur-
poses, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981). For further Critical Legal Studies analyses, see Critical Legal
Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. Rnv. 1 (1984); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement,
96 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1983); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal
Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1669 (1982).
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have objective content .... The acquiescence of individuals to
the liberal rule of law depends upon their continued unshakable
faith in its objectivity.24
Second, proponents of Critical Legal Studies suggest that the very
premises of rationality and objectivity inherent in contemporary legal
scholarship require us to elevate rationality to a position that justifies the
resulting rules of law. What may have initially described a process of
arriving at objective positive laws becomes a justification for those laws.
According to the Critical Legal Studies scholars, the assertion of the his-
torical contingency of rules of law, however, reveals the weakness of such
elevation:
[H]istoricism, [which is] the recognition of the historical and
cultural contingency of law, is a perpetual threat to the aims of
our legal scholarship as conventionally practiced; [and] to de-
fend against the threat (or to protect themselves from becoming
aware of it) legal scholars have regularly and recurrently re-
sorted to certain strategies of response and evasion; ... these
strategies have so influenced the practice of legal scholarship as
severely to limit its intellectual options and imaginative range.25
The essence of this two-pronged attack is that contemporary legal
theory becomes either a highly normative and conservative agenda pro-
ceeding under the guise of neutral processes and objective principles, or
alternatively, a mere rational balancing of subjective preferences based
upon instrumental processes.
In one of the most incisive and direct responses to the criticisms of
Critical Legal Studies, Phillip Johnson has, in effect, challenged such
scholars to meet their own criticisms.26 Johnson appears to agree with
the central conceptual point in the controversy-that contemporary legal
theorist's reliance on rationalism ultimately bars admission of or inquiry
into the normative foundations of legal theory. Describing liberal ration-
alism as the assumption "that there are neutral reasoning techniques that
24. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1206-07 (1981).
25. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981).
26. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REv. 247 (1984). Milner
Ball, who suggests that the Critical Legal Scholars need to acknowledge an "ideological taint,"
restates his idea that "[to] recreate the courts so that they reflect our nature as a people bound
by mutual care is to paint pictures of society that transcend reality. These pictures are...
theologically informed utopias. . . ." Ball, Don't Die Don Quixote: A Response and Alternative
to Tushnet, Bobbitt, and the Revised Texas Version of Constitutional Law, 59 T"hx. L. Rnv.
787, 793, 811-12 (1981). For their responses to Ball, see Tushnet, Deviant Science in Constitu-
tional Law, 59 Tax. L. Rav. 815 (1981); Bobbitt, A Reply to Professor Ball, 59 TEX. L. Rav.
829 (1981).
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can generate solutions that transcend ideological conflicts,"27 Johnson
sharply attacks the "sham neutrality" which characterizes the very pro-
cess of legal reasoning which we learn as students, teach as professors
and experience as objects of the law.
Having agreed on this critical point, Professor Johnson then
presents two insights. First, asking what values, norms or rules of law
are not necessarily subjective and arbitrary, Johnson wonders whether a
principle of equality is any less arbitrary than a defense of inequality.
"Equality is the value that looks as if [it] weren't a value, that can be
made to seem the 'neutral' starting place when values are absent."28
Johnson's second point is that the proponents of Critical Legal Studies
have failed to set forth their own agenda, their own utopia, and their own
normative foundations of law.
29
The current discourse is a vitally important one because it focuses
our attention on the inherent limitations of legal rationality and the in-
herent biases of any science of law-both personal and cultural. The
hesitancy with which we speak of normative foundations of law is
brought to the fore by this renewed debate in legal scholarship. Such
hesitancy must be overcome, however, if we are to begin to construct
normative rather than instrumental justifications for law.
Almost fifty years ago, the German theologian and political philoso-
pher Gerhard Leibholz anticipated the ultimate inadequacy of combining
liberalism and democracy, a union which is at the heart of the debate in
Critical Legal Studies.30 Liberalism, according to Leibholz, is in essence
individualism and has as its fundamental value "the creative freedom of
the individual endowed with reason. '3 1 From this follows "the belief
that a rational solution could be arrived at in all departments of life
through the free and untrammeled competition of individual opinions.'2
In contrast, Leibholz suggested that democracy presupposes a freedom
which has "a universal, collective character."33 The destructive combi-
nation of liberalism and democracy occurs when liberalism calls into
question the political values of democracy:
It is a sign not only of the confusion of democracy with liber-
alism but also of the decline of democracy itself when, as has
often happened, criticism, positivism and relativism are identi-
27. Johnson, supra note 26, at 271.
28. Id. at 276.
29. Id. at 281-85, 289-91.
30. Leibholz, The Nature and Various Forms of Democracy, 5 Soc. RFSEARCH 84 (1938).
31. Id. at 92.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 84.
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fled not only with the political principle of liberalism but with
that of democracy also. Political relativism undermines the
fundamental objective values, the myth and the substance of
parliamentary democracy, and finally calls in question the pre-
supposition on which the functioning capacity of parliamentary
democracy is based, its social and political homogeneity. Rela-
tivism has as its consequence the disappearance of that organi-
zational minimum of common political understanding which is
essential to the functioning of democracy.
3 4
The inadequacy of liberal rationalism reflected by both proponents
and opponents of Critical Legal Studies lies in this defective congruence
of liberalism and democracy. Liberalism, or liberal rationalism, rests
upon a rigid view of individual autonomy and the dominance of human
reason. Yet we find ourselves unable to use that reason successfully to
prove or to persuade others of the validity of what we hold to be moral or
legal. Thus, we retreat to the position that all morals, and hence the
foundational elements of law, are subjective and relative. The only test,
then, for what is valid or objectively true is that which is empirically
verifiable. The rapid ascendancy of the relatively new school of eco-
nomic analysis of law is reflective of our hunger for empirical tests of
validity.
35
These discussions in contemporary jurisprudence misunderstand the
consequences of beginning an inquiry into the nature and function of law
with the implicit premises of individual autonomy and the authority of
reason. Such premises were at the heart of theological controversies
which laid the groundwork for the Enlightenment. In recalling these ori-
gins of the Enlightenment we can see more clearly the inadequacies of
liberal rationalism today, and can formulate a context for appreciating
the ontological, teleological and epistemological fallacies of contempo-
rary jurisprudence.
II. ANTECEDENTS OF CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE
Neither the assertion of individual autonomy nor the primacy of
human reason is unique to the twentieth century. Although the
34. Id. at 95.
35. The seminal works in this field are Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON.
1 (1960); Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSis OF LAw
(2d ed. 1977). See also, Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HoSTRA L. REV. 485-
770 (1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFSrRA L. REV. 811; Posner, The
Value of Wealth. A Comment On Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1980).
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strengths and weaknesses of these approaches to the concept of law are
perhaps more evident today, their antecedents lie in the radical changes
in the manner in which questions of law were conceived during the early
Enlightenment period. During the seventeenth century, these concep-
tions of the individual as an autonomous entity and of individual reason
as ultimate authority became the determinate criteria for Western theo-
ries of law. Reason and rationality became the highest tests for truth,
and the authority of law became simply a derivative of individual free-
dom and individual rights. The individualism and rationalism of the En-
lightenment have degenerated, however, into a relativism which is found
in the twentieth century jurisprudential emphasis on objective
verification.
I am not suggesting that Western conceptions of law are derived
solely from the Enlightenment nor that individual autonomy and human
reason are antithetical to justice. What I am suggesting is far more mod-
est: certain fundamental changes in the seventeenth century approach to
the question of "what is law" are closely analogous to our views of law
today. Consequently, through a renewed appreciation of these religious
and theological contexts of law we can sense the limitations of and new
possibilities for law.
A. Antecedents of the Early Enlightenment
By the early seventeenth century, two formative characteristics of
law and legal reasoning had already developed: the emergence of law as
a science and the isolation of ecclesiastical sources of law. 6
Perception of law as amenable to a rigorous analytic mode of study,
as contrasted with a more passive experience of revelation and divine
law, has been traced in part to "the rediscovery of the legal writings com-
piled under the Roman Emperor Justinian, the scholastic method of ana-
lyzing and synthesizing them, and the teaching of law in the universities
of Europe."' 37 Combining Aristotelian modes of analysis with abstract
principles, legal scholarship during the twelfth and early thirteenth cen-
turies had as its goal the synthesis of legal rules into a comprehensive
body of law. "[T]he first comprehensive and systematic legal treatise in
the history of the West, and perhaps in the history of mankind" 38 has
36. The impact of theology and changes in religious institutions on conceptions of law has
been the focus of an excellent study in legal history. See H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLU-
TION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983); Berman, Religious
Foundations of Law in the West" An Historical Perspective, 1 J. L. & RELIGION 3 (1983).
37. Berman, The Origins of Western Legal Science, 90 HARV. L. REV. 894, 899 (1977).
38. Id. at 921.
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been identified as a treatise by Gratian, a Bolognese monk, composed
circa 1140 and consisting of more than 1400 printed pages.
Three centuries later, this new science of jurisprudence was altered
by the great challenge to vested authority presented by the Reformation.
This challenge involved the theological justification of the individual, the
sinner, before God. Indeed, the second formative characteristic of cur-
rent law-the isolation and limitation of ecclesiastical justification-is
derived from the claims concerning sources of authority made during the
Reformation. The theological elevation of Luther's formulation of the
doctrine of justification by faith through grace meant that the experience
of grace was immediate and individual rather than mediated through ec-
clesiastical hierarchies. With this concept of individualized experience of
the transcendence of God came the subordination of all ecclesiastical au-
thority not only to God, but to the preemptive claim of the direct nature
of individual justification.
Thus, by the close of the sixteenth century two methodological tools
were well in place for the formation of new approaches to law over the
course of the following century: the application of early scientific meth-
ods to the study of law and the posture of each individual as possessing
authority independent of ecclesiastical and secular orders. These were
the seeds of subsequent rationalism and individualism.
Because of transformations over centuries, the causal agents behind
contemporary conceptions of law and justice cannot be isolated too zeal-
ously without falling victim to narrow historicism and distortion.3 9 Any
attempt to gauge at such a distance in time the self-consciousness of
changes in conceptions of the nature and source of law and justice is
problematic. What is possible, however, is to sense the subtle yet signifi-
cant movements in the nature of the assertions themselves regarding law
and justice. Just as no theory is without antecedents, so also no proposi-
tion is completely free from social, cultural or intellectual contingencies.
It is precisely because of such contingencies, rather than in spite of them,
that we might see in the early Enlightenment period certain jurispruden-
tial changes permeating our theories of law today.'
39. On the pitfalls of historicism as a mode of inquiry, see Gordon, supra note 25, and
Horwitz, The Historical Contingency of the Role of History, 90 YALE L.J. 1057 (1981).
40. In terms of the etiology of contemporary moral philosophy, Alasdair MacIntyre finds
similar consequences of the Enlightenment:
The problems of modem moral theory emerge clearly as the product of the fail-
ure of the Enlightenment project. On the one hand the individual moral agent, freed
from hierarchy and teleology, conceives of himself and is conceived by moral philos-
ophers as sovereign in his moral authority. On the other hand the inherited, if par-
tially transformed rules of morality have to be found some new status, deprived as
they have been of their older teleological character and their even more ancient cate-
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The individualism and rationalism which the "Age of Reason" rep-
resents can be seen in the theological controversies of that period. Two
particular religious heresies, Arminianism and Socinianism, constitute
the intellectual bridge by which one moves from original sin and theocen-
tric conceptions of authority to the individualism and rationalism of the
Enlightenment. Within this transformation lies the parallel between the
claims of individual rights and popular sovereignty in the English Civil
Wars, and the ultimate vesting of such principles in the American
Revolution a century later.41
B. Autonomy and Ability: The Arminian Controversy
In the early seventeenth century, the debate over the depravity of
the human condition was that of Arminianism. Technically a contro-
versy on the significance of the "Fall" with regard to the concepts of
predestination, election and righteousness, the Arminian "heresy" was
essentially a renewal of the argument that each individual must play a
significant role in his or her own salvation. For mainstream Protestants
in 1618, as for Augustine in 426 and Luther in 1525, the very assertion of
the individual's ability to choose salvation was a threat to orthodox doc-
trines of God's omnipotence and omniscience-and no less dangerously
an implicit threat to the theological, if not the secular, order. Receiving
its name from Jacobus Arminius, Professor of Theology at Leiden from
1602 to 1609, the basic substance of Arminianism is set forth in five short
"Articles" or propositions compiled by a group of Arminius' colleagues
shortly after his death, and known as "The Remonstrance of 1610."42
The five points of doctrinal dispute reflected in these propositions have
been identified as (1) predestination, (2) the nature and the extent of the
Atonement, (3) the nature and extent of humanity's corruption and de-
pravity, (4) the nature of God's grace and (5) the possibility of a total fall
from grace.43
On first reading The Remonstrance of 1610, students of the twenti-
gorical character as expressions of an ultimately divine law. If such rules cannot be
found a new status which will make appeal to them rational, appeal to them will
indeed appear as a mere instrument of individual desire and will.
A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 60 (1981).
41. For a discussion of the relationship between the Enlightenment and eighteenth century
law, see generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA (1965); G. WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA (1978).
42. The Five Arminian Articles can be found in 3 P. SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF CHRISTEN-
DOM 545-49 (1919). See also CRISIS IN THE REFORMED CHURCHES 207-09 (P. DeJong ed.
1968) for further historical explanation and translation.
43. Klooster, The Doctrinal Deliverances of Dort, in CRISIS IN THE REFORMED CHURCHES
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eth century may interpret it as an extremely orthodox statement of
Christian faith. For instance, Article II states "Jesus Christ, the Saviour
of the world, died for all men and for every man, so that he has obtained
for them all, by his death on the cross, redemption and forgiveness of
sins";" and Article III states "man has not saving grace of himself, nor
of the energy of his free will."45 As with many of the great theological
controversies, however, the very appearance of orthodoxy made the po-
tential threat to vested orthodoxy that much greater.46 The initial and
pivotal question before the Synod of Dort in 1618 was whether salvation
and justification depended on the individual's free choice through faith to
become a believer, as asserted by the Arminians, or whether such free
choice was a false assertion of human ability, God's grace being the sole
cause of justification. That is, do individuals retain, despite the essential
condition of Original Sin, sufficient ability and free will to choose or not
to choose God?
The orthodox Calvinist establishment in the Netherlands perceived
Arminianism as a most fundamental challenge to the Reformed tradition
precisely because any assertion of human choice as integral to salvation
elevates the individual to a status independent of God. This controversy
was ultimately a renewal of Semi-Pelagianism47 and was a battle over the
58-59 (P. DeJong ed. 1968). See also G. CRAGG, FROM PURITANISM TO THE AGE OF REASON
20-30 (1950).
44. 3 P. SCHAFF, supra note 42, at 546.
45. Id.
46. Unusual in the degree of transnational defensiveness which it provoked, the Arminian
controversy raged both in Scandanavia and England. With the convening of the Synod of
Dort on November 13, 1618 to pass judgment on Arminianism, more than 100 ministers,
statesmen and theologians, including representatives from Great Britain, the Palatinate, Hesse,
Zurich, Geneva and each state of the Netherlands, met in session to counter this threat to
orthodoxy. CIsIs IN THE REFORMED CHURCHES 215-20 (P. DeJong ed. 1968). Philip Schaff
described the Synod of Dort as "an imposing assembly; and, for learning and piety, as respect-
able as any ever held since the days of the Apostles." Schaff, The Rise of the Reformed
Churches in the Netherlands, in CRISIS IN THE REFORMED CHURCHES 17 (P. DeJong ed.
1968). See also Praamsma, The Background of the Arminian Controversy (1S86-1618), in CRI-
SIS IN THE REFORMED CHURCHES 22 (P. DeJong ed. 1968).
47. The school of thought identified as "Pelagianism" is derived from the teachings of
Pelagius (late fourth and early fifth centuries), who challenged the doctrine of Original Sin and
consequent bondage of the will. According to Paul Lehmann, "[t]he matter to be clarified is
how the free will of man and the activity of God are related." Lehmann, The Anti-Pelagian
Writings, A COMPANION TO THE STUDY OF ST. AUGUSTINE 203, 209 (R. Battenhouse ed.
1979). It was Pelagius' "contention that... a perfect life was possible because man was, by the
very nature which God had given him, free to pursue the good and to avoid the evil." Id. See
also G. BONNER, ST. AUGUSnINE OF HIPPO (1967).
The term "Semi-Pelagianism" refers primarily to those followers of Pelagius who were
willing to admit that humans have imperfect ability as a result of the Fall and Original Sin, but
who nonetheless maintained the ability of the individual to choose or to reject salvation.
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latter portion of the Reformation formula sola fide sola gratia; that is,
justification by faith through grace.
Politically and legally, the leading proponents of Arminianism
threatened much of the Reformed movement by adhering to an Erastian
position in which ecclesiastical authority was subject to the rule of the
civil and political sovereign. 8 This mixture of a theological assertion of
individual ability with a political assertion of absolute civil sovereignty is
reflected in the writings of Hugo Grotius, a leading proponent of Armini-
anism. According to Grotius, the sovereign political authority-whether
the States of Holland or the monarchy of England-possessed the right
to condemn preaching and teaching at odds with orthodox doctrines.49
The combination of theological liberalism and political authoritari-
anism may well explain the uneasy alliance at the Synod of Dort between
the Anglicans representing James I and the orthodox and radical sects of
Calvinism. All had joined ostensibly to condemn Arminianism. Though
the Anglican representatives were ostensibly concerned with the theolog-
ical doctrines of Arminianism, they were also concerned with what was
perceived as a close affiliation between Arminianism and "Popery. ' 5 0 In
contrast, the orthodox Calvinists sensed a threat to the theological foun-
dations of the Reformation; the more radical Calvinists feared the impli-
cations of the Erastian conception of sovereignty and the intolerance that
flowed from that conception.
Despite the Synod of Dort's success in condemning the Five Articles
of Arminianism,51 the Arminian doctrine ultimately triumphed in two
respects. First, its assertion of individual responsibility for salvation pro-
vided the philosophical and theological basis for the subsequent emer-
gence of individualism in the Enlightenment. Second, the very nature of
the reasoning process in which the debates occurred provided gradual
acceptance of formal logic and rationalism as an authoritative mode of
reasoning.
In asserting individual responsibility to choose or to reject justifica-
tion and salvation through faith, the Arminian position weakened the
significance of sin in the human condition and ultimately elevated the
48. Erastianism refers generally to the doctrine that the authority of the church in ecclesi-
astical matters is subordinate to the authority of the state. Though named for Thomas Eras-
tus, 1524-1583, Erastianism became the focal point of intense debate in the decade preceding
the English Civil War.
49. See H. GROTIOS, RESOLUTION FOR PEACE IN THE CHURCHES (1614). See also
Praamsma, supra note 46, at 31.
50. G. AYLMER, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTrrUTION 1603-1689, 67 (1963).
51. The text of the Canons of Synod of Dort appears in 3 P. SCHAFF, supra note 42, at
550-97, and in CRISIS IN THE REFORMED CHURCHES 229-62 (P. DeJong ed. 1968).
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concept of individual ability to the level of the major determinant in
human affairs. While it may be an overstatement to describe Arminian-
ism as "preeminently the doctrine of Christian rationalism and Christian
humanism," 2 in its attack on predestination and election Arminianism
undermined a concept of ultimate authority based upon a transcendent
being, and replaced it with a claim of individual ability. The concept of
individual autonomy and corresponding responsibility for one's life fol-
lows from the claim of individual ability to decide the theological ques-
tions of justification and salvation.
The second aspect of Arminianism which ultimately prevailed, de-
spite its temporary doctrinal setback, is the very method of discourse and
inquiry into soteriological questions. At stake was the question of one's
ability to prove or "discover" a doctrine of salvation from self-evident
truths. What was developing, however, was the ascendancy of nascent
rationalism in the form of Ramism.
A professor of philosophy at the College de France until his conver-
sion to Protestantism, Petrus Ramus employed a logical method to
demonstrate the necessary unity of knowledge.53 He emphasized the
ability to move from one self-evident axiom to a progressively complex
yet interrelated "chart" or "diagram" of topics, subtopics, parts, sub-
parts and constituent elements.5" By taking the position of relatedness
among principles of art, mathematics, theology and ethics, and their
amenability to consistent analysis, Ramism "provided its adherents with
a secure philosophical and epistemological basis for the belief that
humans can ascertain the mind of God as they set to order their thought
through the methods God has revealed." 5
One of the strongest proponents of Ramist philosophy, William
Ames," was present at the Synod of Dort as a counselor to the Calvinists
52. A. WOODHOUSE, PURITANISM AND LIBERTY 54 (2d ed. 1974). Professor Woodhouse
states that Arminianism "weakens the theological basis of Puritan inequalitarianism, of the
conception of an aristocracy of the elect, and thus undermines the most formidable of the
barriers separating Puritanism from democracy." Id. (emphasis in original).
53. A highly controversial author, Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) was one of the victims, on
August 26, 1572, of the St. Bartholomew massacre.
54. Perry Miller's discussion of Ramism in P. MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 111-53 (1954), firmly locates the place of Ramist logic in the intel-
lectual life of the seventeenth century. "It is not too much to say that, while Augustine and
Calvin have been widely recognized as the sources of Puritanism, upon New England Puritans
the logic of Petrus Ramnus exerted fully as great an influence as did either of the theologians."
Id. at 116.
55. McKim, Ramism in William Perkins vi (unpublished dissertation, University of Pitts-
burgh 1980).
56. William Ames (1576-1633) was a Fellow of Christ's College from 1601 to 1610, when
opposition from the Bishop of London forced him to move to the Netherlands. Ames was a
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in their attack on Arminianism. Ironically, the form and nature of
Ames' analysis of knowledge, 7 and his defense of Calvinistic predestina-
tion, contained in its logic and rationality what was far more congenial to
the theological assertion of individual human ability to elect or reject
salvation. 8
The issue involved in Arminianism and the Synod of Dort was that
of "Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility."59 It would be inac-
curate to portray the Calvinists and Arminians as adopting polar posi-
tions on sovereignty and responsibility, for in much of their theology the
similarities outweigh the differences. On the crucial point of human abil-
ity to elect salvation and even to lose it negligently later, however, the
Arminians presented a conception of individual ability and autonomy
which set incalculable distance between them and the Reformed tradi-
tion. The combination of Ramist rationalism and the Arminian empha-
sis on individual autonomy was an important characteristic of
the dominant modes of reasoning which emerged during the
Enlightenment.'
C. Authority and Sovereignty: The Socinian Heresy
If Arminianism raised the specter of individual ability and free will,
student of William Perkins (1558-1602); and recent studies emphasize the significance of Per-
kins' writings on the development of theology in the seventeenth century. David Little has
described Ames as "the dominant systematic theologian, who expounded and elaborated the
Puritan system from well behind the lines." D. LITTLE, RELIGION, ORDER AND LAW 105
(1969). Charles Munson considers Perkins to be "the key transitional figure between six-
teenth-century high Calvinism and the later seventeenth-century Puritan covenant theology."
Munson, William Perkins: Theologian of Transition 3 (unpublished dissertation, Case Western
Reserve University 1971).
57. Ames developed more fully than Perkins the ramifications of Ramism in a comprehen-
sive system of "technometria" in which all knowledge could be set forth as "a blueprint of the
whole structure of human learning." McKim, supra note 55, at 299.
58. Notwithstanding the criticism of both Perkins and Ames of the Arminian position, the
Ramist method of analysis was equally congenial to the Arminian position. Munson, supra
note 56, at 3. "Ramism is not the differentia between Arminius and Calvinism. Perkins,
whom Arminius charged with the Calvinistic error of predestination, was no less a Ramist
than Arminius." C. BANGS, ARMINIUS: A STUDY IN THE DUTcH REFORMATION (1971),
quoted in McKim, supra note 55, at 424 n.124.
59. Klooster, supra note 43, at 52-94.
60. In a study of the subtle changes in soteriology from Hooker to Baxter, Christopher
Allison finds in the early seventeenth century debates on justification and inherent righteous-
ness the initial separation of morality from theology. "Whatever the causes, the seventeenth
century bequeathed to the eighteenth century in England a soteriology which hopelessly alien-
ated ethics and moral theology from their foundations in theological doctrine." C. ALLISON,
THE RISE OF MORALISM 205-06 (1966). See B. HOLIFIELD, THE GENTLEMAN THEOLOGIANS
186-98 (1978) (tracing the influence of Arminianism in the eighteenth century theology of the
southern colonies).
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Socinianism, another seventeenth century doctrine, extinguished the con-
ception of authority as derived from transcendence and revelation.61 So-
cinianism challenged the theological precepts of both Catholicism and
the Reformation by rejecting the authority of every seventeenth century
orthodox form of "revealed truth." Leading Socinian scholars rendered
Scripture subject to individualized interpretations through reason, re-
jected the doctrine of the Atonement as a superfluous gloss on God's
creation, asserted the free will of individuals against the Protestant claim
of predestination, and dismissed the notion of a community of believers
as being simply an aggregate of individual relations.
The chief characteristic of Socinianism is its emphasis on reason.
Socinians contended that Scripture is significant for life, but only as in-
terpreted through human reason; that the divinity of Jesus is an unneces-
sary postulate, for human reason is able to perceive the greatness of his
moral teachings; that freedom of individual will and ability is a natural
and indispensable corollary to the ability to reason; and that the sacra-
ments possess no more, and perhaps less, transcendent significance than
any other act or event. In its most concise doctrinal statement, The
Racovian Catechism, Socinianism stresses the primacy of reason:
[Reason] is, indeed, of great service, since without it we
could neither perceive with certainty the authority of the sacred
writings, understand their contents, discriminate one thing
from another, nor apply them to any practical purpose. When
therefore I stated that the Holy Scriptures were sufficient for
our salvation, so far from excluding right reason, I certainly
assumed its presence.62
Although its origins antedate Arminianism, going back to the radi-
cal sects of the Reformation in Poland in the late sixteenth century,
63
Socinianism provided support for the Arminian limitations on Original
Sin and its assertion of inherent righteousness of the individual." Dog-
matic only in its modification, if not rejection, of the orthodox doctrines
61. Socinianism derives its name from the teachings and writings of Laelius Socinus (1524-
1562) and his nephew, Faustus Socinus (1539-1604). For an extensive discussion of Socinian-
ism, see generally S. KOT, SOCINIANISM IN POLAND (E. Wilbur trans. 1957); H. MCLACH-
LAN, SOCINIANISM IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1951); E. WILBUR, A HISTORY
OF UNITARIANISM: SOCINIANISM AND 1TS ANTECEDENTS (1945); G. WILLIAMS, THE PO-
LISH BRETHREN (1980).
62. THE RACOVIAN CATECHISM 15 (T. Rees trans. 1818).
63. H. McLAcHLAN, supra note 61, at 10.
64. Id. at 50. Though there were significant theological differences between Arminians
and Socinians, "Arminianism and Socinianism had close affinities and were born of a similar
tendency of mind. The difference between them was more one of emphasis than radical depar-
ture. 'Arminianism was rather the dictate of moral sentiment, Socinianism a product of rea-
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of the Trinity, the Atonement and concepts of sin and revelation, Socini-
anism lacked its own internal theory of theological awareness. Its basic
characteristic was its substitution of the sovereignty of human reason for
the sovereignty of God."
The Socinian approach to the sovereignty of God is indicated by its
formulation of the doctrine of the Atonement: the theory of the neces-
sary causes and effects of the Crucifixion of Christ with regard to sin and
reconciliation with God. In approaching the significance of the Atone-
ment, Faustus Socinus began with the perspective of God as an "offended
party," offended by the sin of the individual. As an offended party, God
stands in the posture of any person who has been offended; just as an
individual can forgive a debt without payment, so also can God.66 It
follows logically, therefore, that God has the right to forgive sins without
exacting punishment or receiving consideration if He so desires. The sig-
nificance of the Crucifixion consequently lies not in its being a "pay-
ment" for sins, but simply in the moral significance of the life of Jesus.
In a lengthy refutation first published in Leyden in 1617, Hugo Gro-
tius carefully and systematically responded to the arguments of Soi-
nus.67 The basis of his defense of the Atonement as a form of satisfaction
for sins is the assertion that God does not stand in the posture of an
offended party in private individual relationships. Instead, God repre-
sents an ultimate ruler in both private and public forms of justice. "[To
punish is not an act properly belonging to the offended party as such...
because otherwise to every offended party would belong per se the right
of punishing."68 "On the contrary, this right belongs to the ruler as
ruler."69 For Grotius, the sovereignty of a transcendent God constituted
the only plausible explanation for the specific act of the Crucifixion.
In contrast to the overtly political nature of the Arminian contro-
son."' Id. (quoting J. TAYLER, A RETROSPECT OF RELIGIOUS LIFE IN ENGLAND 202
(1876)).
65. Id. at 12-13.
66. 2 Socinus, Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum 186, in H. GROTIUS, A DEFENSE OF THE
CATHOLIC FAITH CONCERNING THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST, AGAINST FAUSTUS SOCINUS
xv (F. Foster trans. 1889).
67. H. GROTiUS, A DEFENSE OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH CONCERNING THE SATISFAC-
TION OF CHRIST, AGAINST FAUSrUS SOCINUS (F. Foster trans. 1889).
68. Id. at 55.
69. Id. at 57.
70. The governmental theory of the Atonement developed by Grotius stands in sharp con-
trast to the more personalized and individualized rationalism of the Socinians. Though Gro-
tius was certainly an opponent of Socinianism in the early years of the seventeenth century, his
later writings reflect a clear affinity with Socinian rationalism. See H. McLACHLAN, supra
note 63, at 22.
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versy with its Erastian overtones and political intolerance, the Socinian
controversy on the Continent and in England was more politically sub-
dued. Though Parliament ordered the doctrinal texts of the Socinians
burned in April, 1614,71 and Archbishop Laud pushed the adoption of
the Canons of 1640 condemning Socinianism,72 the highly technical na-
ture of the theological controversies led Herbert Thorndike, an English
divine, to intimate that "this heresy seems to be too learned to become
popular among us."73
While many of the educated elite at Cambridge and Oxford in the
mid-seventeenth century were familiar with, if not attracted by, the rea-
sonableness of Socinian analysis,74 it would be a mistake to view this
"heresy" as essentially or even superficially a political movement. The
significance of Socinianism lies not so much in what it offered, but what
it undermined; it lies not in its anti-trinitarian doctrines, but in its rejec-
tion of the sovereignty of God and the authority of revelation as a source
of knowledge. In Socinianism human reason emerged as the ultimate
authority and as a consequence concepts of transcendent authority be-
came illusory.
Arminianism and Socinianism, as pre-Enlightenment controversies,
cannot be held responsible for the confused status of contemporary juris-
prudence. Nor should they be lifted up as the causative elements of con-
ceptions of popular sovereignty and individual rights. Such
controversies, however, can be viewed as precursors of fundamental
changes in the ontological and epistemological conceptions of the nature
of sovereignty and the authority of reason. The ground had been laid in
these debates for the epistemology of law that ultimately became self-
righteousness:
This unity [of mind in the west] lies in the emancipation of man
as reason, as the mass, as the nation. In the struggle for free-
dom these three are in agreement, but once their freedom is
achieved they become deadly foes. Thus the new unity already
bears within itself the seeds of decay. Furthermore, there be-
comes apparent in this an underlying law of history, namely
71. Id. at 36.
72. Id. at 41. Perhaps not coincidentally the "first modem rationalist," Ren6 Descartes,
was living in Holland during the eighteen months of deliberations at the Synod of Dort.
Descartes published his first expression of cogito ergo sum in 1637, the year that Archbishop
Laud obtained his Star Chamber decree regulating the printing presses in England. Descartes'
DISCOURSE DE LA METHODE was first published in 1637. For a discussion of the decree
regulating the printing presses, see H. MCLACHLAN, supra note 63, at 40.
73. C. ALLISON, supra note 60, at 107.
74. H. MCLACHLAN, supra note 63, at 63-89.
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that the demand for absolute liberty brings men to the depths
of slavery .... Luther's great discovery of the freedom of the
Christian man and the Catholic heresy of the essential good in
man combined to produce the deification of man. But, rightly
understood, the deification of man is the proclamation of
nihilism.
7 5
The present debates in legal scholarship centered on Critical Legal
Studies are contemporary reflections of the Arminian and Socinian con-
troversies. The Arminian emphasis on individual ability and autonomy
has been transformed into an insistence that each person stands indepen-
dently of others in defining moral commitments; and this has become the
individualism which pervades the ontological perspectives in twentieth
century jurisprudence. A theory of law in the context of liberal rational-
ism possesses an epistemology based upon the ultimate authority of
human reason, a defining characteristic of Socinianism, yet denies the
presence of moral assumptions in the reasoning process itself. In our
current concepts of law, authority and morality we are no longer able to
conceive of law as based on something other than custom or power, and
morality as anything other than subjective preference. Therefore, any
alternative to this perspective-any truly adequate jurisprudence-will
be radical indeed, and it will require quite different foundations for the
concept of law.
The realization that contemporary debates reflect seventeenth cen-
tury controversies provides the opportunity to bring to bear in our study
of law the questions which have been inherent in our study of religion
and our experience of faith. What is needed at this point is a self-con-
sciousness of the ontological, the teleological and the epistemological as-
sumptions which we make as we study law. This awareness, in turn,
provides a threshold conceptual framework by which to begin a fresh
approach to jurisprudence.
III. TOWARD NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: SOME
THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
In suggesting that there are alternatives for contemporary jurispru-
dence in the search for the foundations of law I am not asserting the
existence of objective moral principles which are discoverable through
human reason. Nor am I suggesting that historical, analytical or even
empirical approaches offer nothing to elucidate our dilemma. Instead, I
suggest that new perspectives in jurisprudence are possible if we rethink
75. D. BONHOEFFER, ETHics 102-03 (1955).
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all three of the essential elements of the institution of law: the nature of
the community which experiences the law, the ways in which we use the
law and the method of the legal inquiry itself. The experience of legal
and moral requirements in community involves an ontological perspec-
tive; the interpretation of the purposes of law is necessarily a teleological
question; and the problem of method in jurisprudential inquiry is episte-
mological in nature. An alternative epistemology integrated with an
awareness of ontological and teleological assumptions yields a more fruit-
ful inquiry into the concept of law.
The need for such an integration is reflected in the law of commer-
cial pregnancy contracts. Recent advances in reproductive technology
present a broad spectrum of new possibilities to individuals and couples
who desire to have children.76 The acceptance of artificial insemination
over the past decade has given rise to situations in which, for example, a
married couple enters into an agreement with an unrelated female third
party. The agreement provides that the third party will become pregnant
through artificial insemination of the sperm provided by the husband of
the couple. Frequently given the label "surrogate motherhood" relation-
ships, such arrangements usually include a contract which provides that
the third party will carry the fetus to term, deliver the child, and return
the child to the contracting couple following delivery."
In these surrogate motherhood arrangements, the contracting
couple receives a child which is genetically related only to the husband
with the other half of its genetic composition derived from the surrogate
mother. Within the last few years, however, it has become possible to
achieve a complete genetic identity with the contracting couple through
the transplantation of a fertilized ovum to the third party.78 Predictably,
the advent of commercial pregnancy contracts has prompted a growing
76. See Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147 (1980);
Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 611 (1978); Black, Legal Problems of
Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 373 (1981); Comment, Artificial Insemination
and Surrogate Motherhood: A Nursery Full of Unresolved Questions, 17 WiLLAMETrE L.J. 913
(1981); Note, Surrogate Mothering: Medical Reality in a Legal Vacuum, 8 J. LEGis. 140
(198 1); Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Hope for Childless Couples Breeds Legal Exposure for
Physicians, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 311 (1983); Comment, The Surrogate Child: Legal Issues and
Implications for the Future, 7 J. Juv. L. 80 (1983).
77. Advertisements for surrogate mothers began appearing almost ten years ago. For ex-
ample, "Wife is looking for a healthy, blue-eyed woman who is willing to carry my husband's
child. All expenses paid plus $4,000," appeared in the Daily Californian on Nov. 19, 1976,
cited in Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. Rlv. 611, 611 n.1 (1978). See also
Baby Sales, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1983, at A20, col. 1 (editorial); Rosenblatt, The Baby in the
Factory, 121 TIME, Feb. 14, 1983, at 90.
78. See Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies, 70
A.B.A. J. 50 (Aug. 1984).
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body of scholarship on the legal aspects of such an arrangement. Numer-
ous articles have appeared addressing such issues as the applicability of
current adoption laws and existing statutes prohibiting "black-market
baby selling."79 Lawsuits involving disputes over these arrangements
have reached state appellate courts on at least two occasions 80 and one
has resulted in a petition before the United States Supreme Court.8 Leg-
islation is now being considered in several states to authorize and regu-
late such relationships.8 2
Contemporary jurisprudence is more than ready to provide re-
sponses to the questions raised by the advent of commercial pregnancy
contracts. But the challenges posed by such questions test the limits of
the individualism and the insistence on objective neutrality on which this
jurisprudence rests. Using traditional legal terminology such as ade-
quacy of consideration, 3 liquidated damages 4 and specific perform-
ance, 5 legal scholarship suggests that these relationships are amenable to
routine legal analysis. 86 An intuitive sense of uneasiness, however, ac-
companies the application of traditional principles of contract law to
contracts which involve human existence as its subject matter. Although
it is generally assumed that the "law" can and must deal with these con-
tractual relationships in one way or another, a disquietude seems to per-
meate the discussion.
A. An Ontological Premise of Community: What We Believe
Jurisprudence struggles with the most difficult of questions when it
asks what norms, values or morals should constitute the law. Contempo-
rary jurisprudence flounders in relativism, however, because it fails to
express the ontological premises of the "morals" it hopes to identify or
79. See Comment, Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate Mother's Right to 'Rent Her
Womb'for a Fee, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 539 (1983); Note, The Surrogate Child: Legal Issues and
Implications for the Future, 7 J. Juv. L. 80 (1983); Bowal, Surrogate Procreation: A Mother-
hood Issue in Legal Obscurity, 9 QUEENS L.J. 5 (1983); Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human
Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 639 (1983).
80. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981); Syrkowski v. Appleyard,
122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983), rev'd, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
81. Doe v. Kelley, cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). Justice Brennan would have granted
certiorari.
82. See Andrews, supra note 78, at 56.
83. Note, The Surrogate Mother Contract in Indiana, 15 IND. L. REv. 807, 828 (1982).
84. Id.
85. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 611, 620 (1978); Note, Surro-
gate Mothering: Medical Reality in a Legal Vacuum, 8 J. LEGIS. 140, 148 (1981).
86. Perry Vieth has suggested that "[c]reative contracting may avoid many of the
problems associated with surrogate mothering." Note, Surrogate Mothering: Medical Reality
in a Legal Vacuum, 8 J. LEGIs. 140, 149 (1980).
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refute. The only ontological premise, if any, expressed in such jurispru-
dence is the radical autonomy of the individual from the community.
The ontological question concerns the nature of being. For pur-
poses of the study of law, the ontological question is the extent to which
the authority of law derives from a belief that the essence of being is in
the autonomous individual or from a belief in the social nature of the
human community. In the former the perspective is one of individual-
ism. In the latter the perspective is one in which individual existence is
comprehended as part of the social, the "self-other" relationship.
Though there is a hesitancy among certain Critical Legal Scholars
to admit the relevancy of religious questions or perspectives in moral
philosophy or the study of law, 7 the nature of the questions to be asked
is indeed emerging within the context of these recent discussions. In
their recent free-wheeling dialogue on legal theory in a symposium on
Critical Legal Studies, Peter Gabel and Duncan Kennedy touched upon
the ontological question in Gabel's suggestion that "alienation is onto-
logical," yet recoiled from pursuing it directly. 8 In a more substantive
article in the same symposium, Thomas Heller acknowledges liberalism's
"intellectual retreat from theology and ontology," 9 and evaluates the
structuralist and poststructuralist method of avoiding the delimiting per-
spective of the autonomous self.90 The ontological question has long
been a pivotal question for studies in religion, theology and philosophy.
These most recent exchanges in legal scholarship suggest that the time
has arrived for bringing this question to the fore in contemporary juris-
prudence as well.
87. "[Moral philosophy... accomplish[es] little more than a certain intimidation of those
of us less versed in particularly scholarly fields." Tushnet, supra note 24, at 1213-14. Phillip
Johnson has recognized the religious strains which occur in the writings of certain Critical
Legal Scholars, despite their disavowal of transcendence. Johnson, supra note 26, at 285-89.
Johnson observes that "Religious questions have to do with our perceptions of ultimate reality,
our sense of what life is really about. Such beliefs form our values, and law reflects those
values .... It is only prudent to take that reality into account in everything we do." Johnson,
supra note 26, at 288-89.
88. Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1, 18 (1984). While
Kennedy preferred to rest with the summary that "'Alienation is ontological' is my impover-
ished statement of what I would rather put in the form of 'nothingness is the worm at the heart
of being,'" id. at 19, Gabel was insistent that "the word 'ontological' is a true word-that
there is something called 'social being.'" Id. at 45. See generally, Critical Legal Studies Sym-
posium, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984).
89. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. Rnv. 127, 176 (1984).
90. Several significant contributions to legal philosophy have involved the analysis of
structuralism. See, eg., Hermann, Phenomenology, Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal
Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 379 (1982); Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U.
PA. L. REv. 291 (1985).
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It has been argued that individual rights and freedom of contract
give a surrogate mother the right and the freedom to enter into a com-
mercial pregnancy contract if she so desires. 91 Consequently, the inter-
ests of the child, which are the subject matter of the contract, are
relegated to a subordinate status. While individuals may differ in their
religious or ethical views of such relationships, a complete deference to
individual preference in this matter is little more than moral relativism.
The ontological fallacy is the premise that the individual is the
source of authority for the existence of such morals. If each person
stands apart and alone in his or her declarations of morals then individ-
ual autonomy is inescapable. The corollary is precisely that of the
Arminians: the individual is able to choose effectively the good and the
evil.
What is missing from contemporary jurisprudence is the possibility
that the nature of being is relational rather than individual. If one hy-
pothesizes that each of us exists only in and through a community, then
morals or norms or principles might be essentially, if not necessarily, the
defining characteristics of such relations. A sense of individuality would
remain under this hypothesis, but it would be inseparable from a sense of
the dependency of one's self on the "self" of another person. Thus, the
substance of existence would be found neither in one's self as autono-
mous nor in the autonomy of any other person. Rather the essence of
our individuality, and the substance of moral convictions, would lie in
the complexity of interpersonal relationships. 92
This is the conviction that moral reality lies not in individual per-
ceptions but in a sense of complicity. The term "complicity" as it is used
here does not mean the common sense of shared guilt for a crime, but
rather the sense in which the understanding of one's self is necessarily
and essentially a part of one's understanding of community. 93 Morals,
principles and norms would thus be "located" in the ontological charac-
ter of personal and interpersonal relationships. The declaration by a
91. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147, 161-69
(1980). See also Goldfarb, Two Mothers, One Baby, No Law, 11 HuM. RTS. 27 (1983).
92. In his ETmIcs, Dietrich Bonhoeffer cautions against the danger of beginning one's ethi-
cal theories with the individual self and other persons as autonomous entities:
The life of deputyship is open to two abuses; one may set up one's own ego as an
absolute, or one may set up the other man as an absolute. In the first case the rela-
tion of responsibility leads to forceable exploitation and tyranny .... In the second
case what is made absolute is the welfare of the other man, the man towards whom I
am responsible, and all other responsibilities are neglected.
D. BONHOEFFER, supra note 75, at 196.
93. See M. BUBER, I AND THOU (2d ed. 1958) and H. NIEBUHR, THE MEANING OF REV-
ELATION (1941) for two modem theological analyses of this ontological perspective.
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community, through majoritarian processes, of the validity of certain
morals would in this manner not be any more authoritative than a simi-
lar declaration by a single individual, however. The validity and author-
ity of morals would lie in the essential nature of the interdependent
existence of individuals in community.94
An ontological premise of community would provide contemporary
jurisprudence with a significantly different perspective in resolving the
dilemmas posed by commercial pregnancy contracts. It would not only
allow, but would necessitate consideration of the impact of such con-
tracts on the nature of the family. Moral assumptions concerning the
bonding which takes place over a nine month gestation period would
have to be considered in the formulation of laws. The existence of other
children of the surrogate mother and the possible impact of the transfer
of the child to the contracting couple on those children would not only
be an appropriate element for consideration, but a necessary element.
Individual rights of the respective contracting parties would obviously
continue to play a significant role, but the community in which the le-
gally authorized or regulated transaction takes place would have a voice
in formulating the law.
Similarly, our foreknowledge that breach of contract disputes will
arise over the failure of the surrogate mother to turn over the child fol-
lowing delivery, or refusal by the contracting couple to accept the child,
would require us to evaluate the appropriateness of the remedy of specific
performance in light of the broader community in which the child must
be assigned a home, if not a parent. A jurisprudence based on an onto-
logical conviction of the essential interdependence of individuals in com-
munity would take into consideration the transcedent nature of familial
responsibilities as it would map out the parameters of individual conduct.
In moving from an ontology of self-righteous individualism to an
ontology of complicity, the question of what we believe about law is
based on the we that make this inquiry. In this way we might avoid the
dilemma of Arminianism which was the inability to retain any concept of
community as an integrating principle. A concept of authority today re-
quires more than an assertion of individualized autonomy to sustain and
legitimize law. It requires an understanding of the essential nature of
community which makes possible a recognition of the individual within
community. As suggested by Milner Ball,
94. John Finnis comes close to such a premise in his description that the "sharing of aim
rather than multiplicity of interaction is constitutive of human groups, communities, socie-
ties," and in his assertion that one of the three elements of justice is "other-directedness." J.
FiNNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 152, 161 (1980).
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[t]he search for the source of authority leads from the Constitu-
tion to the constitution of the society, from the beginning of the
republic to the biblical beginning. The immediate, material re-
pository for authority is the Constitution. The Constitution
draws authority from the constituting act. The constituting act
evidences community.95
B. Teleological Differentiation in Law: What We Believe
A second fallacy of contemporary jurisprudence is its failure to dif-
ferentiate the multiple functions of law. The teleological question for ju-
risprudence involves the purposes or ends of law in more than a purely
instrumental fashion. A teleological perspective in jurisprudence is one
that includes consideration of the ends of the law, in terms of goals. As
the term is used here, however, it connotes "ends" that are more than
simply the intended consequences of the law or its underlying policies.
Teleology suggests far more. As applied to jurisprudence, a teleological
perspective examines the nature and validity of law in terms of final or
ultimate ends, not just of a particular law, but of the phenomenon of law
itself. A teleological perspective necessarily involves consideration of the
manner in which law is part of interpersonal existence.
96
95. M. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW 15 (1981).
96. In a recent article, Gregory Alexander identifies "a general trend towards a new and
overtly teleological analysis." G. Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitu-
tional Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1545,
1550-51 (1982). Alexander uses the term "teleological mode" to refer to contemporary legal
scholarship which rests on a superficially scientific and objective methodology. Id. at 1549.
Using entitlement theories of property law as his context, Alexander points out that the teleo-
logical approach avoids the "property vel non question," focusing instead on the concepts of
due process and just compensation. With this approach the validity of laws dealing with enti-
tlements is determined not by the status of an entitlement as property, "but by its relation to
the theory of substantive values attributed to the concepts of just compensation or due pro-
cess." Id. at 1552. His conclusion is that the scientific approach of such teleological scholar-
ship was necessitated by the failure of conventional scholarship to acknowledge the inherent
contradictions between entitlement theories of property and the ideological conviction of indi-
vidual autonomy. This new teleological mode, however, serves only to "preserve the same
liberal values of individuality and autonomy." Id. at 1598.
In contrast to Gregory Alexander's use of "teleological" to refer to modes of reasoning
that are primarily scientific, perhaps objective, and certainly instrumental in nature, my use of
the term "teleological" incorporates those ends or purposes which are grounded in religious,
philosophical or existential convictions about the nature of being. In this manner, a teleologi-
cal perspective not only permits but requires the explicit recognition of the role of moral and
religious beliefs in politics. As I propose it, a teleological analysis in the context of entitlement
theories of property law would force the realization that the ontological premise of liberalism
has long been one of individual autonomy. Indeed, the Arminian doctrine of individual auton-
omy combined with Socinian emphasis on the authority of human reason provides quite close
correlations with the recent scientific analysis of law.
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With a teleological perspective, the radically different types of laws
become evident. Certain laws are intended as purely instrumental in a
narrow sense, such as traffic control regulations, and may be designed to
regulate or control specific forms of behavior in a manner which is rela-
tively nonobjectionable. Other laws are designed to protect or foster
ideals or concepts which persons hold to be central to their existence,
such as religious freedom and rights of association and speech. A teleo-
logical perspective in its deeper sense helps one recognize the validity of
certain types of laws in terms of instrumental results, yet does not require
that validity of law be defined in terms of instrumental results. When
viewed in terms of ultimate ends, the validity of law will rest heavily on
convictions about the ultimate ends or purposes of the human commu-
nity. This conjunction, however, is what seems to be missing in the ten-
dency of legal scholarship to look towards narrow, objective, short term
ends to ascertain the validity of law.
Despite the common application of legal policies, there is something
essentially different between a typical contract for personal services and a
commercial pregnancy contract. When there has been a breach of an
ordinary contract for personal services, the remedy of specific perform-
ance is rarely available. In commercial contracts for the delivery of
unique goods, specific performance may well be available. In dealing
with a contract for the production of a child, the application of such
traditional contract remedies is inappropriate. Similarly, there is an es-
sential difference between a legal pronouncement that all commercial
pregnancy contracts are illegal, subjecting the parties to criminal sanc-
tion, and a pronouncement that such contracts are merely void and un-
enforceable as a matter of public policy. In the former context, society
declares that certain behavior will not be permitted; in the latter, though
such behavior is permitted, neither party to the contract can seek the aid
of a court in ordering enforcement of the contract.
In the situations involving commercial pregnancy contracts, there is
an assumption that if existing law is able to design plausible judicial solu-
tions to contract disputes, then this new contractual relationship should
not be indirectly or directly regulated by new positive laws. A second
assumption seems to be that the role of legislation in this area should be
limited to rather narrow functions. Any suggestion that the culture has a
stake in the existence of parent-child relationships is carefully avoided.
The difficulties with such assumptions are that contemporary jurispru-
dence offers no clear guidance as to whether a matter should (a) be left to
the domain of unrestricted freedom of contract, (b) be subject to regula-
tion by positive law yet still permitted within broad parameters or (c) be
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
completely prohibited as a matter of public criminal law. The difference
between these alternatives involves an understanding of the functions of
law in society. The nature of law must be differentiated according to
function, for the relationship of law and morals may be extrapolated
from the relationship among the different functions of law.
A concept of law which embodies differential functions or uses was
first formulated most clearly during the Protestant Reformation. Martin
Luther expressed the Doctrine of Usus Legis as the concept that law
serves different functions: a theological use, a political-civil use and a
didactic use.97 The theological use of the law, according to Luther, is to
foster awareness of the essential self-righteousness and pride which
blinds us to our own limitations and fallibility. The political-civil use of
the law is the expression of positive law by a community or society for
the purpose of protecting and effectuating the essence of the community
itself. The third use of the law, the didactic use, is that which encourages
and guides individuals as members of a community to do and to be more
than may be required by the positive laws of the community. Each func-
tion, then, is directed towards the accomplishment of certain ends. The
theological use of law is to reveal sin and separation from God; the polit-
ical use is to minimize chaos and establish order; the didactic use is to
encourage greater expression of selfless love.
But these "ends" of the law are, for Luther, not merely instrumental
goals. They are the defining characteristics of "uses" themselves. Im-
plicit in each function or use of law is the existence of an ultimate foun-
dation beyond its simple creation by an individual or a community. The
object of the law was a knowledge of the limitations of individual ability
(theological use), a necessary participation of the individual in commu-
nity (political-civil use), and an essential participation of the individual in
community (didactic use). Only in the political-civil use of law does pos-
itive law rest on penultimate authority of the state as sovereign. 98
A second characteristic of the Doctrine of Usus Legis which has
97. For a more complete analysis of the formulation and implications of Usus Legis, see F.
Alexander, Validity and Function of Law: The Reformation Doctrine of Usus Legis, 31 MER-
CER L. REv. 509 (1980).
98. This teleological formulation of the functions of law differs significantly from Ronald
Dworkin's characterization of teleological theories. He suggests that a theory of law is distin-
guished from other theories only in that the "goals" which the law is to achieve constitute part
of the definition of the law itself. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 169-71. The teleological
nature of the Lutheran formula, however, finds in the essence of law not only a goal or pur-
pose, but also an antecedent existence of a transcendent source of authority for law and for
each of the functions of law. Cf. MacIntyre's suggestion that the loss of teleological founda-
tions for ethics was the elimination of "any notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-
telos," which had the result that "[m]oral judgments lose any clear status and the sentences
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significance for contemporary jurisprudence is the interdependent nature
of the different functions of law. Specifically, the political-civil use of the
law is subject to the theological use of the law. Though ordained by
God, a political sovereign is never absolute in its authority. The theolog-
ical use of the law stands as a radical critique of the righteousness of the
state. In turn, the didactic use of the law both presupposes and is subject
to the theological use of law. Though one may believe one knows what is
morally required, one cannot become righteous in moralizing. The con-
stant and creative tension of law and morals exists most clearly in the
didactic use of law, but the theological use stands as a barrier to prevent
the merger of law and morals from becoming legalism or antinomianism.
In this sense, the theological use of law-the understanding of human
fallibility and the tendency to self-righteousness-was described by Lu-
ther as the prima usus legis.
A teleological conception of law is precisely that which allows an
acknowledgement of our limitations to create the possibility of greater
awareness. In this conception, individual autonomy, human reason and
political sovereignty are consequently rejected as possible foundations of
the ultimate authority of law. As Paul Lehmann has stated:
Thus, the primus usus legis denotes a political reality. Its rec-
ognition is a datum of the knowledge of faith. Its functional
reality, however, is independent of such recognition. A refusal
to entertain the possibility that faith can supply what reason
cannot arrive at, is itself the expression of faith, of a faith indif-
ferent or blind to political reality. The dynamics of the primus
usus legis, however, embrace both positivism and pluralism as
penultimate instruments of a sovereignty whose unifying action
is the point and the purpose of politics.99
The teleological confusion which characterizes contemporary juris-
prudence is two-fold. First, it is the inability to differentiate the civil and
didactic uses of law, and second, it is the unwillingness to recognize tran-
scendent elements in the rule of law. Failure to differentiate the civil and
didactic uses leads, in the case of commercial pregnancy contracts, to
unacceptable options. A position which dissolves the civil use of law into
the didactic use insists that positive law (whether civil or criminal) man-
date all that may be morally desirable and maximize legislation of moral-
ity. A position which rejects the relevancy of a didactic function of law
which express them in a parallel way lose any undebatable meaning." A. MACINTYRE, supra
note 40, at 52, 57.
99. Lehmann, A Christian Alternative to Natural Law, in DIE MODERNE DEMOKRATIE
UND IHR RECHT 541 (K. Bracher ed. 1966).
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allows the civil function to be a statement of what is desirable. A differ-
entiation of these two functions allows one to argue in favor of positive
legislation regulating commercial pregnancy contracts only to the extent
that such legislation is justified by one's moral assumptions about co-
existence in community. It would also require one to decide at what
point the positive law must not attempt to legislate one's moral convic-
tions. This differentiation of functions is the difference between insisting
that commercial pregnancy contracts be regulated only as much as may
be necessary to protect the interests of individuals as part of a commu-
nity, and insisting that such contracts be criminally prohibited. Rea-
soned deliberation is necessary to discern how deeply such relationships
affect the very nature of our existence together. 10°
In this alternative theory of the nature and foundations of law I
have outlined an ontological premise and a teleological characteristic: a
premise which begins with a conviction about the essential character of
community and an analysis of content which embodies the antecedent
reference to differentiated functions of law. Neither point suggests an
objective natural law which is eternal and perceptible by human reason.
Although it is certainly normative in some senses of that term, these
points suggest primarily a different way of asking the question of what we
believe about the law.
C. A Tolerant Epistemology: What We Believe
If, as Critical Legal Studies suggest, the fallacy of contemporary lib-
eral rationalism is its pretense of neutral, objective, rationally verifiable
rules of law, we are still entitled to ask whether any hope is to be found in
the suggestion that "[o]ne must step outside the liberal paradigm, into a
realm where truth may be experiential"? 101 Does this mean that descrip-
tively the liberal paradigm is inadequate in pointing to truth, or does it
mean prescriptively that truth is essentially experiential? If truth is expe-
riential is it therefore necessarily relative and subjective (and thus not
"truth"), or is it indeed substantive and somehow transcendent? In its
criticisms of dominant legal theories, Critical Legal Studies is correct in
exposing the inherent limitations of both rationalism and empiricism,
100. This teleological distinction between the civil use of law and the didactic use of law
preserves the prophetic critique by law of existing political institutions and structures, and
prevents the collapse of legal principles into legal justification of positive law. This is similar to
the suggestion made by Roberto Unger in his critique of objectivism, that what is needed "is a
conception of the ideal that should guide the reconstruction of the institutional forms." Un-
ger, supra note 23, at 583.
101. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1237
(1981).
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and there seems to be little disagreement on this point among the
"counter-remonstrants" such as Phillip Johnson."°2 One must be care-
ful, however, not to fall victim to the alternative hypothesis that if
neither rationalism nor empiricism yields answers, there can be no
answers.
The third error of contemporary jurisprudence is epistemological in
nature. As the study of theories of knowledge, epistemology involves the
question of how we know what we claim to know. The Socinian doctrine
of the sixteenth century has given contemporary theories of law an epis-
temology which insists upon definite concrete substance to our knowl-
edge. That is, the total content of what law is must either be that which
we rationally conclude to be law or which we can empirically verify to be
law. The elevation of rationalism to a position of ultimate authority has
created an intolerance for ambiguity and subjective beliefs.
Yet, the pivotal methodological issue lies precisely in not moving so
quickly from the extremes of rationalism to empiricism, or from individ-
ualism to relativism. A decision that there are limits to our rationality
does not compel the conclusions that there are either rational objective
truths which are a priori or that morals are inherently relative and sub-
jective. While certainly both conclusions are plausible, the demise of lib-
eral rationalism may point to another possibility.
This possibility is the conviction that individual ability and collec-
tive rationality are incapable of perceiving ultimate substantive truths.
Yet, this conviction is neither the necessary nor the essential denial of the
existence of transcendent norms. 1°3 Theologically, this is the orthodox
concept of Original Sin. Our own self-righteousness is precisely that
which stands in the way of a full experience of a transcendent God. To
the orthodox theologian or a person of deep faith it is an obvious proposi-
tion that God exists in spite of our own inability to be God. Yet to those
attempting in legal scholarship and jurisprudence to arrive at the ulti-
mate foundations of law, the unanswerability, or at least uncertain de-
monstrability, of transcendent principles is an unacceptable barrier to
accurate theories.
To accept a principle of human limitation, however, whether in the
deep sense of Original Sin or otherwise, is not to suggest the futility of all
102. See Johnson, supra note 26.
103. John Finnis responds in part to the problem for natural law theories which is posed by
diversity of opinions and beliefs by quoting Leo Strauss' statement that "'knowledge of the
indefinitely large variety of notions of right and wrong is so far from being incompatible with
the idea of natural right that it is the essential condition for the emergence of the idea: realiza-
tion of the variety of notions of right is the incentive for the quest for natural right."' J.
FiNNis, supra note 94, at 29.
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inquiries into law and justice."° As theologians from Augustine to
Bonhoeffer have argued, the search for a coherent theory of law is neces-
sary so long as we remain convinced of the penultimate essence rather
than the ultimate essence of such a theory. To have a methodology of
inquiry which contains the epistemological conviction of our inherent
limitations is not to refute this enterprise before it begins. Instead, it
encourages the enterprise and allows for greater possibility. 105 It was in
this vein that earlier philosophers of law could suggest without embar-
rassment such concepts as "natural law with a variable content," 10 6 or
"creative natural law.""1 7
The unacceptability of a theory of natural law today is due precisely
to the self-righteousness of human reason which develops, defends and
attacks such theories. As Paul Lehmann succinctly observed, "[t]he flaw
internal to the natural law and its tradition in western ethical thought is
that human reason cannot bear the normative weight assigned to it." 108
An epistemology which is aware of its self-righteousness allows for the
possibility that differences in norms, morals or the foundations of law
may well be a reflection on the nature of human beings rather than an
indication of the nature of moral reality. It allows for the possibility that
our knowledge and our existence, as well as knowledge of our existence,
contains an antecedent affirmation of transcendence. As suggested by H.
Richard Niebuhr, it will also enable us to restate our cogito ergo sum as
"'I am being thought, therefore I am,' or, 'I am being believed in, there-
fore I believe.' "109
A jurisprudence which contains an epistemology aware of the limits
of rationalism would not develop narrow legal answers to the dilemmas
104. Paul Carrington's not so subtle characterization of scholars in the genre of Critical
Legal Studies as nihilists who "ha[ve] an ethical duty to depart the law school," reflects per-
haps Dean Carrington's own sense of uneasiness with an epistemology in jurisprudence which
admits simultaneously the presence of ideological convictions and the fallibility of human ra-
tionality. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 222, 227 (1984). A portion
of the hailstorm provoked by Dean Carrington's articles is reflected in the correspondence
reproduced in 'Of Law and the River,' and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1 (1985).
105. "Yet, to set aside the search for some truth-in-itself does not overthrow objectivity or
abandon us to relativism. Rather, it frees us to discover and to develop comprehensive, fruitful
perspectives and to extend the horizon of our understanding." Ball, Don't Die Don Quixote: A
Response and Alternative to Tushnet, Bobbitt, and the Revised Texas Version of Constitutional
Law, 59 TEx. L. REv. 787, 793-94 (1981).
106. See C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 249 (1930) (discussing
R. STAMMLER, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE (1925)).
107. R. POUND, supra note 9, at 14.
108. Lehmann, supra note 99, at 531.
109. H. NIEBUHR, THE MEANING OF REVELATION 140 (1941).
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posed by commercial pregnancy contracts quite so readily. The magni-
tude of the aspects of these relationships, which are not objective, not
quantifiable and not concrete, demands a jurisprudence which at the
minimum seeks the assistance of other disciplines such as theology,
moral philosophy, psychology and family counseling. The emotional and
subjective aspects of such relationships would not be viewed as irrelevant
to the formulation of legislation; rather, an inquiry into such aspects
would be essential to appropriate laws. The fact that individuals may
hold strong differences of opinion as to the appropriateness or desirabil-
ity of commercial pregnancy contracts would not compel the conclusion
that there is no justification for a law restricting or prohibiting such ar-
rangements. Instead, it would compel a more cautious and conscientious
response to what is technologically possible. The possibility that far
more may be taking place in the dynamics of human reproduction than
we can objectively quantify or rationally analyze requires a jurisprudence
which eschews the availability of quick answers by accepting the possibil-
ity of more ambiguous answers.
My final suggestion for an inquiry into law and morals is the combi-
nation of my first three suggestions. By asking about law the questions
we ask about religious faith, we can adopt an ontology in which moral
reality is found in complicity, a teleology in which the various purposes
of law are not confused, and an epistemology which is aware of its own
limitations.
As suggested by Gerhard Leibholz toward the close of the Second
World War:
[T]o rediscover the foundations and creative moral forces of the
[basic values of human life] a new spiritual realism is necessary.
After the experiences of the last century have shown the frus-
trations of all attempts to build a new political order on a
purely humanitarian basis, the resurgence of such a realism can
only come through those who are aware that the basic values of
human life transcend liberalism and derive their ultimate bind-
ing force from deeper spiritual sources than from a man-cen-
tered philosophy or doctrine.1 '
IV. CONCLUSION
With rare exceptions, contemporary jurisprudence flounders be-
cause it has embraced too deeply the pre-Enlightenment controversies of
Arminianism and Socinianism. A primacy of individual autonomy and
110. G. LEIBHOLZ, POLrrIcs AND LAW 86 (1965).
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human rationality have given us theories of law in which morals are rela-
tive and where instrumentalism seems to be the test for law.
What is needed in contemporary jurisprudence is a reformulation of
the manner in which we inquire into the nature and function of law, and
consequently, into the relationship between law and morals. Our inquiry
must begin with an acceptance of the limitations of the authority of rea-
son, yet with a conviction of the possibility of a transcendent source of
law. We must identify the functions of law while understanding the pur-
poses of law with reference to an antecedent authority. We must pursue
the essential character of law in moral reality, while grounding that real-
ity in complicity.
